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Misreading Svechin:
Attrition, Annihilation, and Historicism
I
David R. Stone
Modern scholarship rightly gives Soviet military theorists great credit for their central role in the development of modern concepts of mechanized warfare 
and operational art.1 At the same time, those who study military thought have 
resurrected imperial Russian officer and Soviet theorist Aleksandr Andreevich 
Svechin (1878-1938) from undeserved obscurity.2 Svechin, an historian and military 
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Abstract
Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin is often misperceived as an 
advocate of strategies of attrition over destruction or annihilation. In fact, 
Svechin was an historicist, who saw the precise balance between attri-
tion and annihilation, or defense and offense, as constantly shifting as 
a result of changing material circumstances. A close examination of his 
theoretical and historical works reveals the depth of his thinking, while 
his response to Russia’s 1916 Brusilov Offensive shows his support for 
ambitious strategies of annihilation under the proper circumstances.
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Marshall, Bruce Menning, and the Journal’s anonymous reviewer.
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thinker who bridged the divide between 
imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, is given 
pride of place among Soviet theorists for the 
breadth and systematic nature of his approach, 
avoiding the mechanical and doctrinaire 
application of Marxism that plagues some 
of his contemporaries like the brilliant and 
ambitious Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii. 
Svechin’s work, particularly as laid out in such 
monumental works as Strategy and History of 
the Military Art, approaches On War of Carl 
von Clausewitz in its scope and insight. 
The irony, however, is that Svechin had 
almost nothing to say about the mobile 
warfare that came to be the Soviet Union’s 
contribution to operational thinking. Though 
Svechin was central to formulating the 
definition of operational warfare as a stage 
intermediate between tactics and strategy,3 
his most productive years were finished before armored vehicles and aircraft 
reached the level of development that required fundamentally new approaches to 
the battlefield. He became embroiled in a Soviet campaign against former tsarist 
military officers at the beginning of the 1930s, and was executed in 1938 in Joseph 
Stalin’s purge of the Red Army’s officer corps. As a result, through no fault of his 
own, and despite all his virtues as a military thinker, Svechin’s career as a theorist 
was over too soon to devote much time or attention to the problems of mobile, 
mechanized warfare. The seminal Soviet insights came instead in works from 
younger theorists such as V. K. Triandafillov’s The Character of Operations of the 
Contemporary Army and G. S. Isserson’s The Evolution of Operational Art.4 Because 
Svechin’s works generally belong to an earlier technological age, scholars have 
often missed the real essence of his military thought. In particular, the breadth of 
Svechin’s thinking has often been shoe-horned into narrow appraisals centering 
around limited and schematic questions: which approach to military strategy is 
superior—annihilation or attrition? Offense or defense? Too many scholars have 
seen Svechin as a single-minded adherent of attrition or defensive strategies, 
missing the real message of his work. Svechin was at his core an evolutionary 
thinker, one who regarded proper military art as always changing with the 
environment and circumstances. Contrary to his common perception in the West 
3. Jacob Kipp, “Two Views of Warsaw: The Russian Civil War and Soviet Operational Art, 
1920-1932,” in R. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, eds.,The Operational Art: Develop-
ments in the Theories of War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 61.
4. V. K. Triandafillov, Kharakter operatsii sovremennykh armii (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1929); G. 
S. Isserson, Evoliutsiia operativnogo iskusstva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1932).
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as an advocate of attrition, or of defensive strategies, Svechin regarded judging 
one sort of strategy as inherently superior to another as the height of folly. 
While some scholars rightly note the subtlety and complexity of Svechin’s 
views, and do not portray him as a one-sided advocate of attrition,5 he has been 
overwhelmingly characterized in the Western scholarly and professional literature 
as a partisan of attrition as the proper basis for strategy and tactics. Svechin was an 
unabashed admirer of the German military historian Hans Delbrück (1848-1929), 
and adopted Delbrück’s distinction between a strategy that attempted to achieve 
victory by incremental steps, draining and exhausting the enemy through attrition 
(Ermattungsstrategie) and a strategy of victory through a rapid and overwhelming 
effort at annihilation (Niederwerfungsstrategie). Svechin’s usual word for attrition 
is izmor, from the verb morit’ (to exhaust, to drain). A less common term for the 
same concept is istoshchenie, from the verb istoshchit’ (to emaciate, to exhaust). 
Svechin balanced attrition against its countervailing strategy of destruction or 
annihilation. Svechin’s word here is sokrushenie, from krushit’ (to shatter, to destroy). 
The widespread consensus on Svechin’s one-sided advocacy of attrition makes the 
mistake of taking a strategy that Svechin indeed did support for the limited and 
particular circumstances of Soviet Union in the 1920s (and even here his view is 
more nuanced than often presented) and generalizing from that particular and 
qualified judgment to a claim that it represents Svechin’s views of the military art 
more broadly. The picture of Svechin as a partisan of defense and attrition over 
offensive strategies of annihilation has proved remarkably persistent.6 
5. For example, R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 
1917-1991 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992), 49. In Jacob Kipp’s “Two Views,” 67, 
the emphasis is on Svechin’s advocacy of attrition for the specific case of the Soviet Union in the 
1920s, not a more general claim for the superiority of attrition. See also Kipp, “Military Doctrine 
and the Origins of Operational Art, 1917-1936,” in Willard C. Frank and Philip S. Gillette, eds., 
Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 
1992), 110, and “Military Reform and the Red Army, 1918-1941: Bolsheviks, Voyenspetsy, and 
the Young Red Commanders,” in Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds., The Challenge of 
Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2000), 129-130. 
6. On Svechin as a partisan of attrition over destruction, Condoleezza Rice writes that 
Svechin was convinced of “the fallacy of operations in depth to achieve decisive victory” and 
claimed “the next war would be of attrition” but in support of this only cites Svechin’s entire book 
Strategy without any particular reference: “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed., 
Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 665. John Erick-
son remarks that Svechin favored attrition in “Koalitsionnaya Voina: Coalition Warfare in Soviet 
Military Theory, Planning, and Performance,” in Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, eds., Coalition 
Warfare: An Uneasy Accord (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), 
101. David Glantz contrasts Tukhachevskii’s advocacy of annihilation with Svechin’s preference 
for attrition in “The Intellectual Dimension of Soviet (Russian) Operational Art,” in McKercher 
and Hennessy, Operational Art, 128; see also David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army 
on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 82-3. Shimon Naveh re-
ferred to Svechin’s “perception of the future war as one of static attrition” and his attachment to 
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“nineteenth-century notions of attrition and limited warfare” in In Pursuit of Military Excellence: 
The Evolution of Operational Theory (Oxford: Frank Cass, 1997), 180-181. Richard Harrison calls 
Svechin “an unabashed defender of the strategy of attrition” in Russian Way of War, 129. Earl 
Ziemke argues Svechin believed “war of attrition was inescapable in the currently prevailing 
circumstances and battle of annihilation would only be fought, if at all, when one side or the 
other was near exhaustion,” but does not cite Svechin to support this, only a Soviet collected 
work: A. B. Kadishchev, Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), 14-16, in The Red Army 1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revo-
lution to US Ally (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 167 and 367, fn. 63. See also James J. Schneider, 
“Svechin, Aleksandr Andreyevich,” Encyclopedia of Russian History (New York: Thomson Gale, 
2004),4:1505. 
7. N. Pavlenko, “Some Questions Concerning the Development of Strategic Theory in the 
1920s,” in David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, eds., The Evolution of Soviet Operational 
Art, 1927-1991: The Documentary Basis (London: Frank Cass, 1995), II:76-77.
8. V. D. Sokolovskii, Voennaia strategiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), published in English 
by the RAND Corporation as Soviet Military Strategy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 
1963).
To be clear, this essay argues that Svechin did not in fact advocate the supremacy 
of attrition over destruction. Instead, Svechin presented attrition and destruction as 
two different approaches to military operations, either one of which might be superior 
to the other depending on the concrete circumstances of the moment. Attrition 
and destruction were, for Svechin, opposites in constant tension, with the precise 
balance between them varying based on terrain, manpower, technology, and politics. 
At a particular time under particular circumstances, as in the Soviet Union in the 
1920s, attrition might be superior to annihilation. Under different circumstances, 
that relation could and did change. Svechin’s studies of military history and past 
military theorists attempt to elucidate that shifting balance of strategies over time. 
His own theoretical works emphasize the need for careful sensitivity to concrete 
reality. Finally, Svechin’s own analysis of Russia’s recent military past, particularly the 
1916 offensive by Russian General Aleksei Brusilov, reveals him as an advocate of 
bold strategies of destruction, at least under the proper circumstances.
Svechin and the Marxists
Generally speaking, Soviet sources did not fall into the trap of reading Svechin 
as a one-sided advocate of attrition. In 1966, N. Pavlenko fully appreciated Svechin’s 
careful weighing of the pros and cons of all modes of warfare, and the dependence 
on circumstances of the proper approach at any particular time.7 The centenary of 
Svechin’s birth brought an appreciative essay by A. Ageev in the Military-Historical 
Journal, which conceded that Svechin’s works were “not in the strictest sense of the 
word Marxist,” but applauded their erudition and insight, along with the author’s 
ability to largely overcome his unfortunate bourgeois background. Svechin’s Strategy 
was studied in Soviet military higher education until its replacement in the early 
1960s by V. D. Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy.8 While Ageev criticized Svechin’s 
adoption of Delbrück’s categories of attrition and destruction, his claim was not 
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9. A. Ageev, “Voennyi teoretik i voennyi istorik A. A. Svechin,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 
no. 8 (1978), 126-8.
10. Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), 7:264.
11. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, “Kurskaia bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitel’noi dok-
triny,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, no. 8 (1987): 32-40, esp. 37; Michael 
MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington: Brookings, 1991), 326-329; 
William Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1998), 165-166.
12. Kokoshin, “O voine i politike,” 139.
that Svechin had mistakenly emphasized one form over another, but that the very 
division between the concepts was overly scholastic and artificial (in Svechin’s 
defense, he clearly saw the need for flexibility in the choice of strategy).9 The 1979 
Soviet Military Encyclopedia awarded Svechin a brief but positive entry, noting his 
transition from imperial officer to Soviet theorist, and judging that his work was 
marked by its “richness of factual material, breadth of presentation of questions, and 
deep analysis, and to this day retains its intellectual significance,” and making no 
claims for him as a partisan of some particular sort of warfare.10
Once Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Kremlin in 1985, military 
reformers urged a fundamental rethinking of Soviet military doctrine, which had 
long been biased towards offensive action. These new thinkers pushed for a more 
defensive orientation in Soviet military policy, employing historical examples and 
theoreticians to bolster their case. Andrei Kokoshin and V. Larionov, for example, 
used the 1943 battle of Kursk to argue for the advisability of a defensive strategy.11 
Kokoshin, one of the few civilians to hold high positions in the Ministry of Defense 
in the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras, brought Svechin to bear, given Svechin’s more 
balanced views of the relationship between offense and defense, in order to justify 
a more defensive doctrine and force structure. Even when employing Svechin to 
make a political point, though, Kokoshin did not attempt to turn him into a whole-
hearted advocate of attrition or the defense. While noting Svechin’s advocacy of a 
strategy of attrition for the Soviet Union in the 1920s, Kokoshin was quick to point 
out that contrary to his contemporaries (who were too trusting in the virtues of the 
offensive) Svechin “viewed offense and defense in their dialectical unity.”12
What explains this divergence in views—that Westerners see Svechin as an 
advocate of attrition while Soviets and Russians find him much more balanced? 
The answer may lie in the influence in the West of one man, one of the few Soviets 
to condemn Svechin as a partisan of attrition: theorist and commander Mikhail 
Tukhachevskii. Tukhachevskii’s death at Stalin’s hands in the 1937 purge of the 
Red Army’s high command made him into a martyr, but his undoubted talents 
and unjustified execution should not conceal a darker side to his character. The 
irony is that Tukhachevskii was perfectly willing to use vicious political smears and 
ideological attacks to further his own position and career. He did just that to Svechin, 
and Western views of Svechin as an opponent of offensive strategies of destruction 
are quite similar to some attacks Tukhachevskii mustered against Svechin in the 
1920s. In his introduction to a Russian edition of Delbrück’s History of the Military 
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13. Mikhail Tukhachevskii, “Predislovie k knige G. Del’briuka,” Izbrannye proizvedeniia 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), 2:134, 138, 144.
14. See Kipp, “Two Views,” 62. Kipp similarly sees Svechin’s emphasis on the relation of the 
military art to circumstance, but describes this as a Hegelian dialectic. This essay takes a different 
Art, Tukhachevskii detoured to savage Svechin as Delbrück’s “wholehearted and 
unconditional” disciple. He claimed that Svechin viewed “war by attrition as a 
historical necessity,” and condemned him as an imperialist sympathizer. Svechin’s 
views, Tukhachevskii held, were so bizarre as to be explicable only as deliberate 
efforts to undermine Soviet defenses:
[Svechin’s] position is so absurd, so scholastic, that it forces us to 
consider the question: what is it exactly that hides behind these 
exotic flowers of fantasy, what is its true essence, covered by these 
theoretical conceptions? The answer is that the basic leitmotif of 
Svechin’s strategy, beyond his lack of understanding of the use of 
dialectical materialism, is his bowing before the strength and stability 
of the capitalist world and raising the form of the positional period 
of the imperialist war into an ‘eternal truth’ without accounting for 
later technical and social developments.
Svechin was, in essence, “a conduit for the influence of bourgeois ideology on the 
theory of military art.”13
This essay does not simply argue that Tukhachevskii was wrong, and that it is 
incorrect to see Svechin as a partisan of attrition. Instead it seeks to explain why 
that view is incorrect, an explanation that also helps us to understand the vicious 
attacks of Svechin’s Bolshevik contemporaries. Svechin fell short of Bolshevik 
standards of ideological rectitude because he was an evolutionary thinker instead 
of a properly dialectical one. Though this distinction may appear at first glance to be 
subtle to the point of meaninglessness, it had real significance in the environment 
of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union. Quite strikingly, evolution (in Russian, evoliutsiia) 
appears again and again in Svechin’s writings and in the titles of his important 
works. His major work on military history is the Evolution of Military Art; his best 
appraisal of previous thinkers is the “Evolution of Strategic Theories”; his analysis 
of Russia’s World War I strategy is the “Evolution of Strategic Deployment.” In 
using this term, however, Svechin was not an evolutionary thinker in the Darwinian 
sense. There was no parallel in his thought to the struggle of individuals and 
species to survive and propagate themselves. By evolution, Svechin meant slow 
and gradual changes in response to an altered environment (thus having some 
parallels to Darwinism), but an environment altered by politics, economics, and 
technology in the case of warfare. The proper approach to war at one particular 
moment and circumstance could be utterly inappropriate to another moment and 
another circumstance. To Svechin, the essential flaw in far too many theorists and 
generals was their inability to recognize that times and conditions changed, and 
strategy and tactics had to change with them. For Svechin, then, the undeniable 
constant was that in war there were no constants; everything always changed.14
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view, given the way in which Hegel’s dialectic represented history as having a clear direction and 
goal, while Svechin’s evolution lacked any defined goal or end point.
15. Svechin, Predrassudki i boevaia deistvitel ’nost’ (St. Petersburg: Berezovskii, 1907), ex-
cerpted in Postizhenie voennogo iskusstva: Ideinoe nasledie A. Svechina (Moscow: Russkii put’, 
1999), 70.
16. Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), in Rob-
ert Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1972), 4.
17. A. Svechin, “Evoliutsiia operativnogo razvertyvaniia,” Voina i revoliutsiia, no.  5 (1926), 
p. 4.
Well before the Russian Revolution made it politically necessary for Russian 
thinkers to embrace Marxism and dialectical approaches, Svechin recognized the 
inapplicability of general laws. In 1907 he wrote
The great commanders, like all successful practitioners, were above 
all sons of their age. In Napoleon’s epoch it would be fatal to imitate 
the techniques of Frederick the Great, and now the application 
of the techniques of Napoleon’s epoch will lead only to failure. 
Successful action must first be appropriate to time and place, and 
for that it must be in accord with contemporary conditions. . . . 
If our understandings do not change in correspondence with the 
progress of the military art, if we stay frozen to one point and bow 
before unchanging laws, we gradually lose sight of the essence of 
things. Deep ideas become harmful prejudices.15
Put in these terms of constant shifts in response to altered circumstances, Svechin’s 
approach shares Marxism’s materialism: the concept that material conditions 
are fundamental to human behavior and human institutions. As Marx himself 
expressed the idea,
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage of development of 
their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, 
and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness 
of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness.16
Nothing in this emphasis on material reality was at odds with Svechin’s own views, 
and under the Soviets Svechin attempted to harmonize his beliefs with Marxism 
wherever possible. He went out of his way to attack military idealism—the belief 
that better morale or fighting spirit could and should overcome the material reali-
ties of numbers, technology, and tactics. He savagely attacked tsarist general and 
military historian A. M. Zaionchkovskii as an “ultra-idealist” for his neglect of 
concrete material factors in warfare.17
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18. I. Rostunov, “Sovetskaia voennaia istoriografiia v mezhvoennyi period,” Voenno-is-
toricheskii zhurnal, no. 11 (1967), 91.
19. Mikhail Tukhachevskii, “O strategicheskikh vzgliadakh prof. Svechina,” in Protiv reak-
tsionnykh teorii, 5, 7. On the irony of Tukhachevskii, later a victim of political machinations, 
victimizing Svechin, see A. A. Kokoshin, “A. A. Svechin: O voine i politike,” Mezhdunarodnaia 
zhizn’, no. 10 (1988), 134.
20. A. Svechin, “Opasnye illiuzii,” Voennaia mysl ’ i revoliutsiia, no. 2 (1924), 44.
But for all Svechin’s acceptance of change through time as a result of changing 
material conditions, he was not a Marxist and was correctly recognized as such 
by his Soviet contemporaries and those who came after them. Certainly, much of 
the criticism of Svechin by his Soviet contemporaries was self-evidently unfair. 
As one Soviet later pointed out, Svechin had even been attacked for the sin of 
studying history in chronological order.18 But however vicious its tone, much 
Soviet work accurately noted Svechin’s fundamentally non-Marxist approach. 
Mikhail Tukhachevskii declared flatly that
In the period of NEP, Svechin began a sort of “Change of Signposts” 
course [a movement among non-Marxist Russian intellectuals 
to accept Bolshevik rule as legitimate], and some considered that 
Svechin was trying to become a little bit Marxist. Of course, this 
could be only the greatest mistake. Svechin was not a Marxist and 
never intended to be one. . . . If Svechin was obliged, disguising 
himself, to apply Marxist terminology, to put on a Marxist costume, 
that was only because otherwise it would have been impossible for 
him to promulgate his views.19
Tukhachevskii went on to twist and distort Svechin’s views in an unfair and irre-
sponsible manner, but he was correct on at least one point: Svechin’s approach 
missed key elements of Marxist thinking. For one, Svechin lacked a good Bolshevik 
commitment to the inevitability and centrality of revolution, and he was chided for 
that. In Svechin’s article on the need for Soviet Russia to rid itself of notions of geo-
graphic and climactic invulnerability, the editors of Military Thought and Revolution 
noted that his “basically correct position” took an “exclusively geographic point-of-
view” and failed to grasp that “any war against the USSR is a war against proletarian 
revolution, i.e. a civil war. The outcome of such a war will be conditioned on the 
real correlation of international forces [that is, the assistance of the proletariat of 
other countries] in comparison with which territorial successes alone cannot have 
vital significance.”20
Intellectually, Svechin tried to portray himself as a Marxist, but he did not 
convince his Soviet critics and, one gets the impression, he did not convince 
himself. He proclaimed his allegiance to the dialectic, but he meant something 
quite different than Marxism’s understanding of the dialectic as a teleological 
process of necessary development towards some pre-ordained end. By dialectic, 
Svechin had in mind the productive clash, interplay and resulting shift between 
ideas—in the case, offense or defense, attrition or annihilation. In 1930, for 
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21. “Tsennost’ voenno-istoricheskoi podgotovki komandira,” Krasnaia zvezda, 1 May 1930, 
in Postizhenie, 502-3. 
22. Joseph Stalin, “O dialekticheskom i istoricheskom materializme,” Pravda, 12 Septem-
ber 1938.
23. I. Rostunov, “U istokov sovetskoi voennoi istoriografii,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 
8 (1967), 91.
24. Svechin, Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1927), I:20-21.
example, he dismissed formal bourgeois logic as clearly inferior to dialectical 
reasoning. Formal logic, treating categories as rigid and unchanging, led thinkers 
seriously astray: “The speed of evolution of the military art that we sense only 
underlines how the dialectic penetrates the entire sphere of military affairs and 
makes up its essence, how weak the methods of formal logic are in discussing 
military art and what a dangerous path this formal logic can divert us towards.” 
Bourgeois thought, Svechin said, attempted to reduce military matters to “eternal 
principles,” but those simply did not exist.21
But Svechin’s allegiance to change and his aversion to eternal, invariable 
principles did not in itself make Svechin a Marxist. His dialectic—in effect, a 
dialogue between two opposing principles--lacked a central element of Marxist 
thinking: its directionality. Svechin’s dialectic, like Darwinian evolution, lacked any 
fixed goal or end. Material circumstances changed and the military art changed with 
them, but their movement was a random walk, not purposeful. Marxism, particularly 
as interpreted in the Soviet Union, saw progress towards the ultimate triumph of the 
proletariat and world revolution: in other words, history had a direction. As Stalin 
put it in 1938, “the dialectical method holds that the process of development must 
be understood not as movement in a circle, not as simple repetition of what has 
come before, but as movement forward, as movement upward, as a transition from 
an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from simple to 
complex, from lower to higher.”22 Svechin had room to maneuver in the somewhat 
more open atmosphere of the 1920s, but with Stalin’s rise to power, interpretations 
of Marxism became increasingly rigid and the space for views such as Svechin’s 
disappeared. Svechin did not share Marxism’s confidence in history’s progress 
towards proletarian revolution, and that hurt him in Lenin and Stalin’s Soviet Union. 
Decades after Svechin’s death, when it again became safe in the Soviet Union to 
discuss him in reasonably objective terms, Soviet historians recognized him as an 
incisive thinker and master of his factual material. Nonetheless, I. Rostunov, the 
leading Soviet historian of World War I, found that Svechin never gave a “genuinely 
materialist interpretation” of military history.23
Svechin was indeed not a Marxist. He was instead best described as an 
historicist, much like Delbrück, whom Svechin deeply admired and from whom 
he took so much. Even in the Soviet period, Svechin was highly complimentary 
to Delbruck’s insights.24 This historicism—the insistence that the past must be 
judged on its own terms, that each age and culture has its own nature and ethos, 
that ideas and values cannot be arbitrarily applied across distance in time—lay at 
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25. Svechin, “Evoliutsiia strategicheskikh teorii,” in B. Gorev, ed., Voina i voennoe iskusstvo 
v svete istoricheskogo materializma (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1927), 62.
26. “Tsennost’ voenno-istoricheskoi podgotovki komandira,” Krasnaia zvezda, 1 May 1930, 
in Postizhenie, 503.
27. Rostunov, “U istokov,” 91; A. A. Kokoshin, “A. A. Svechin: O voine i politike,” Mezh-
dunarodnaia zhizn’, no. 10 (1988), 135.
the foundation for Svechin’s rejection of eternal and unchanging laws of war. In 
the same way, these concepts also lie at the heart of his rejection of the inherent 
superiority or inferiority of one form of war over another.
The Evolution of Attrition and Annihilation
The very idea that one form of warfare could be regarded as inherently 
superior runs contrary to the complexity and subtlety of Svechin’s thinking, which 
at every turn rejected rigid, doctrinaire, or one-sided approaches. In particular, 
Svechin repeatedly criticized previous theorists for their unthinking adherence 
to a particular approach regardless of circumstances or conditions. That said, 
his approach to past thinkers was not to measure them against an unchanging 
standard of correct or incorrect views, but instead on whether they were capable 
of perceiving the reality that surrounded them. “It would be unjust,” he said, “if we 
were to see our task in condemning or awarding laurel wreaths to the thinkers of 
the past.”25 Indeed, the systematic study of military history made sense only in a 
context of constant change that required breadth and perspective. A static world 
would indeed permit the luxury of analyzing the world as it was, and then stopping 
upon reaching a universally valid conclusion. But in reality, “the significance of 
military history grows colossally when each passing month forces us to account 
for new facts, changing the very basis for the conduct of battle—whether it’s 
the tank or the revolutionary movement, self-propelled artillery accompanying 
infantry, or the transition from individual to collective farming.”26 He regarded 
the value of his military history in providing perspective and breadth, and his 
Soviet interpreters recognized that. Rostunov saw that Svechin “did not pretend 
to provide aid in the resolution of concrete strategic or tactical problems.” Instead, 
military history was “to broaden the field of vision of Soviet military cadres, arm 
them with knowledge of the rational development of the military art, develop their 
capability for independent military thought,” or as Kokoshin put it, to “stimulate 
and develop independent thinking,” not “to present rules and recommendations 
ready for all circumstances.”27
Svechin’s culminating work Strategy lays out various approaches to military 
operations. “Military actions,” he writes, “may take various forms: destruction 
and attrition, defense and attack, maneuver and positional warfare. Each of these 
forms influences significantly the strategic line of conduct.” The choice among 
these, however, is not predetermined by the inherent superiority or inferiority 
of any particular approach. Instead, “the political leadership has the obligation, 
after attentive consultation with strategists, to direct military action at the front 
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to destruction or to attrition. The contradiction between these forms is far deeper, 
more important, and carries more significant consequences than the contradiction 
between attack and defense.”28
Destruction/annihilation is simpler; it turns questions of strategy into 
questions of operations: destroy the enemy forces utterly, and strategy becomes 
superfluous. On the other hand, it requires extraordinary decisiveness on the part 
of the commander to recognize the proper moment to act and to have the moral 
courage to act. It also puts the army seeking total victory into a vulnerable position, 
as failure to achieve that victory will leave it extended, out of supplies, and liable to 
destruction itself. The enemy army must itself be vulnerable to being trapped and 
destroyed completely, for otherwise it may retreat out of danger. Thus the choice of 
a strategy of destruction is predicated on particular circumstances: “If the means 
at hand are completely inappropriate for the given situation, then it is necessary 
to abandon destruction.”29 The point here, though, is that Svechin has presented 
conditions for the use or rejection of a strategy of destruction; it is not inherently 
inferior to attrition.
At times, Svechin’s attitude towards a strategy of annihilation is quite positive. 
A strategy of destruction, he writes, rather than sparring indecisively with an 
enemy, “strives to avoid fencing and has a single means to do this: the constant 
and energetic development of its own blow directed at the most vital center of the 
enemy; the more concentrated and massive our own fist, the sooner the enemy 
is forced to orient his own actions to ours, i.e., in the old saying ‘we will dictate 
operational laws to the enemy.’”30 Attrition, by contrast, surrenders initiative. 
“The limited blows by which a strategy of attrition is carried out,” Svechin holds, 
“constrain the enemy to a far lesser degree” than a strategy of destruction, and 
“the enemy has the full capability of pursuing his own objective in this game of 
operational deployments.”31 That said, Svechin suggested that modern conditions 
put some obstacles in the path of successful use of destruction: the speed of 
modern warfare required operational pauses to enable railroad and supply nets to 
catch up, while total mobilization of society meant that single campaigns, however 
successful, might not exhaust a state’s ability to resist.32 By contrast to the relative 
simplicity of a campaign aimed at the total and rapid destruction of an enemy, 
Svechin saw a strategy of attrition as complex, given the range of means and targets 
available. It did not offer the luxury of focusing exclusively on the destruction of 
an enemy’s main forces.33 Contrary to the notion that Svechin believed attrition 
inherently superior to destruction, he argued instead that “the difficult path of a 
DAVID R. STONE
684  ★ THE JOURNAL OF
34. Strategiia, 431 [247].
35. Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva, 174, 188, 190, 228, 259, 287.
36. Svechin, “Evoliutsiia strategicheskikh teorii,” 57-58, 62.
37. “Evoliutsiia strategicheskikh teorii,” 65-66.
38. Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva, vol. I, 335.
strategy of attrition, leading to the expenditure of far greater means than a short 
destructive blow at the enemy’s heart, is generally chosen only when a war cannot 
be finished at one stroke.”34
While Strategy presented Svechin’s theoretical and contemporary ideas on 
attrition and destruction, his more historically-oriented works similarly saw 
change and shifting balances as inherent to warfare, and resisted any notion of 
the inherent superiority of particular modes of warfare. In early modern Europe, 
Svechin argued, most campaigns used attrition through maneuver; as Machiavelli 
himself noted, it was safer than risking a cause to the uncertainty of battle. 
The great Gustavus Adolphus could count on 10,000 new recruits a year—an 
impressive number for the early 1600s, but not nearly enough to risk a strategy of 
annihilation. Napoleonic destruction, however effective for Napoleon, was simply 
impossible for the smaller armies of seventeenth century Europe. Only once armies 
reached the vast size created by the French Revolution could commanders dare to 
risk the catastrophic losses a battle of annihilation might produce. The ultimate 
failure in the Great Northern War (1700-1721) of King Charles XII of Sweden, 
a gifted battlefield commander, was a result of his attempt to pursue “a strategy of 
annihilation under completely unsuitable circumstances.”35
Svechin’s discussion of military theory, like his discussion of military history, 
emphasized evolution over time. Take, for example, his contrasting views of English 
theorist Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (1718-1783) and the German Dietrich 
Heinrich von Bülow (1757-1807). Writing in the milieu of the cabinet wars and 
relatively small armies of the eighteenth century, Lloyd emphasized the limits of 
armies’ capabilities, and the wisdom of avoiding battle and letting supply problems 
and disease win victory through attrition. Svechin endorsed Lloyd’s approach not 
because attrition was inherently a better strategy, but because it was appropriate to 
the time and circumstances: Lloyd’s “theory, devised as a theory of the Seven Years’ 
War, was in many respects correct for the conditions of that war.”36 Svechin was not 
as kind to Bülow, who grasped the importance of the French Revolution and the 
new mass armies that the revolution made possible, but was nonetheless marked by 
the geometrical thinking of the eighteenth century. He clung to attrition through 
maneuver as the ideal strategy, not realizing the “evolution from Frederick’s attrition, 
with its preference for maneuver, to Napoleon’s destruction, with the all-deciding 
extraordinary victory in battle. Bülow’s beloved methods were flanking positions, 
offering a threat to enemy communications, and other bloodless means. This is correct 
for certain stages of attrition, but to make such positions into a dogma . . . was, of 
course, mistaken.”37 Napoleon’s strategy of annihilation, by contrast, was appropriate 
to and possible only in an age of mass armies.38
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The same German historicism that shaped Delbrück had earlier formed 
Clausewitz, and Svechin clearly regarded Clausewitz as much as Delbrück as a 
kindred spirit. This was not a merely a matter of their social background as military 
professionals from Europe’s Old Regime—after all, Lenin himself admired 
Clausewitz as a military theorist, and many Bolsheviks followed his lead. The most 
important link between Svechin and Clausewitz was their shared appreciation of 
the complexity of war as a social phenomenon, and as a result the impossibility of 
reducing it to eternal truths or simple, universally applicable principles. The proper 
role of the military theorist was not to prescribe, but to inculcate habits of clear 
thinking. As Svechin saw it,
If the eighteenth century divided the practice of the military art 
into good and bad, depending on whether it corresponded or not 
with the ‘eternal principles’ of the particular moment, Clausewitz 
saw that each epoch had its own conditions which any particular 
approach would have to accommodate. The conduct of war before 
the French Revolution was neither bad nor reprehensible, but 
corresponded to the character of its epoch, determined by real 
conditions.
While lesser thinkers rushed to condemn the attrition-based strategies of the eigh-
teenth century, Clausewitz did not fall into that trap.39
Svechin’s endorsement of Clausewitz required some effort to harmonize with 
Clausewitz’s clear preference for strategies of destruction. As Svechin conceded, 
Clausewitz “directed all his talent at characterizing the strategy of annihilation; 
among all the goals which one might pursue in war, Clausewitz always underlined 
the one goal that dominated all others—the destruction of the vital force of the 
enemy, and the necessity of winning not an ordinary battle but a great victory by 
means of an enveloping attack or attacking a turned flank, which alone would 
allow the pure destruction of the enemy.”40 While Svechin was not as opposed to 
strategies of destruction and annihilation as is often perceived, he certainly saw 
attrition as a viable and at times preferable strategy. He contextualized Clausewitz’s 
bent for strategies of annihilation as a reaction against more bloodless approaches 
of the eighteenth century, but emphasized Clausewitz’s sensitivity to context and 
circumstance: 
equal with this tradition of Napoleonic annihilation, which 
Clausewitz interprets for future generations, he notes that the 
variety of concrete circumstances is extraordinarily great, and that 
in each particular case it is necessary to take a decision based not on 
any sort of theoretical position, but exclusively on the characteristic 
particulars for the given concrete situation.  Annihilation is not 
feasible in every war, and thus one may be forced to apply contrary 
methods of action.41
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Svechin illustrated this by Clausewitz’s own work on Prussian contingency plans 
for war with France. When Prussia enjoyed the advantage of allies, Clausewitz 
thought in terms of an overwhelming drive on Paris. When political circumstances 
were not as promising, Clausewitz planned a limited campaign to occupy Belgium 
and then go over to the defensive.42
Svechin was kinder than one might expect to Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-
1869), Clausewitz’s chief rival as a theorist in the late nineteenth century. Jomini’s 
rigidly geometric approach and emphasis on strategies of annihilation would, 
it seems, make him an easy target for Svechin. Instead, Svechin hinted that 
Jomini might be considerably more subtle than his later adherents and detractors 
suggested. He suggested that those following in Jomini’s tradition took his ideas 
much too far:
Jomini’s works pushed military thought towards the recognition of 
a Napoleonic strategy of annihilation as the only correct one, and 
towards the condemnation of other commanders to the extent that 
they did not hold to the principle of annihilation. Jomini himself, 
however, did not commit such a crude error.43
As Svechin neared his own time, his verdicts on military theorists continued 
to praise flexibility and sensitivity to circumstances while condemning blind 
dogmatism. In the context of a broader discussion of Sigismund von Schlichting 
(1829-1909), Svechin argued that the real “genius” of Helmuth von Moltke (the 
Elder, 1800-1891) was “his taking into account new material conditions in which 
to carry out the military art, and correspondingly changing his methods,” despite 
the criticism he suffered from contemporaries for failing to live up to Napoleonic 
standards.44 Schlichting himself fell victim to excessive rigidity, failing to recognize 
and adapt to the changes that took place after Moltke the Elder’s era.
When examining the twentieth century, Svechin indeed saw a tendency 
towards the superiority of attrition over destruction. Nonetheless, he did not regard 
this as permanent, for the rate of change in military affairs was only increasing. 
In The Evolution of Military Art, he wrote that “the pace of evolution in our time 
has so greatly accelerated that in the course of a single war we can observe this 
evolutionary dynamic. Both the world war and civil war of recent years represent 
quite complex phenomena; the military art at various moments in them stood 
at different levels, and we do not have the right to look at them statically, as 
something determined and unmoving.”45 Furthermore, certain campaigns and wars 
showed the continuing potential of destruction. The Russo-Turkish War (1877-
1878) for Svechin illustrated the positive results that could come from energetic 
campaigns.46 That said, the power and capability of the modern state, even as it 
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created the large armies that had permitted strategies of destruction in the era 
after the French Revolution, gave armies colossal endurance and survivability. 
Despite the emphasis that plans typically placed on initial clashes at the border, 
“the evolution of the contemporary life of the state more and more turns the 
soldier at the front into an advance guard, the fate of which is only one part of a 
nation’s struggle.” The Crimean War and the American Civil War both showed the 
importance of strategies of attrition to their ultimate resolution. “Do not,” Svechin 
asked rhetorically, “all contemporary technology and economics push towards a 
strategy of attrition?”47 An extended discussion of the mobilization possibilities 
of contemporary states led him to conclude the “probability that future wars, 
particularly their initial stages, will be in the style of attrition.”48
Svechin made a similar point with regard to the defense of the Soviet Union 
itself. As Jacob Kipp has noted, Svechin argued in 1924 for the greater suitability 
of a strategy of attrition to defend the Soviet Union.49 Indeed, Svechin attacked 
the tsarist general and military historian A. M. Zaionchkovskii for his failure to 
recognize how circumstances had changed, but what is significant here is the 
way in which Svechin employs evolutionary concepts to attack Zaionchkovskii’s 
commitment to a strategy of annihilation:
The development of the Russian state (and incidentally, of other 
states) slowly increased its preparation for a lengthy war: attrition, 
not destruction. This process advanced unnoticed even for the very 
leaders of reform in the army. Zaionchkovskii recognizes only a 
strategy of annihilation . . . but the rigorous evolution which 
the author does not recognize presents him with a shift towards 
attrition in Russian preparations for mobilization.
For Svechin, Zaionchkovskii’s position, by refusing to see the material changes that 
dictate a change in strategy, “means rejecting evolution, tilting at windmills, being 
an incorrigible idealist and holding in contempt the material basis for action.”50 
For Svechin, then, the real sin is not adherence to maneuver and destruction, but 
rejecting the lessons offered by material reality. 
Svechin’s Soviet critics, though happy to enumerate his sins, generally failed to 
accuse him of arguing for the universal superiority of attrition. At the 1931 session 
devoted to a systematic demolition of his authority, one Nizhechek, summarizing 
the results of the harangues, proclaimed “It is well-known that Svechin in all his 
works insistently pushes his idea of war by attrition as the single possible means 
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of conducting war in our strategic epoch [emphasis added],”51 thus not necessarily 
other times and circumstances. Even Tukhachevskii, despite his merciless attacks 
on Svechin, at this point conceded that Svechin was not an advocate of a strategy 
of attrition in all times and circumstances. Instead, “Svechin considers that each 
epoch corresponds either to a strategy of attrition or a strategy of annihilation. 
In particular, he carries this theory through to our time and says that war in the 
imperialist epoch, and in particular the imperialist war of 1914-1918, developed 
in conditions of attrition, that annihilation was impossible, that only by attrition 
was it possible to achieve this or that result . . .”52 Tukhachevskii, who never missed 
an opportunity to attack Svechin, did not at this time attack him for one-sided 
adherence to attrition under all times and circumstances, but instead for adherence 
to attrition when, in Tukhachevskii’s view, the conditions for massive and decisive 
action were indeed present.
Taking Svechin’s limited claims for the superiority of attrition in the particular 
case of Russia for the early part of the twentieth century, and reading them as 
general maxims for the universal superiority of attrition over destruction, or of 
defense over offense, is deeply mistaken. Svechin’s creative work was closed down 
in the Soviet Union just when industrialization was beginning to provide the 
Red Army with the masses of tanks and aircraft that might make a strategy of 
destruction possible once again. Indeed, there are tantalizing hints that Svechin 
was beginning to see the ways in which technology would change the nature of 
warfare. In 1924, for example, in “Dangerous Illusions,” he argued that it was foolish 
for Soviet policymakers and military thinkers to emulate their Russian forebears 
and presume that “endless Russian territory, providing a broad space for retreat; 
inability of a foreign enemy to reach Russia’s political center; and the Russian 
winter, which will halt any invasion” together rendered their country invulnerable 
to attack. A drive on Moscow from the Western border would require occupying 
over 200,000 sq km of land, but Napoleon had managed such a feat. “We must 
keep in mind,” Svechin wrote, “that the telegraph, radio, aviation, automobiles--all 
modern technology—are great devourers of space.”53
On the related question of the superiority of offense over defense, or vice-
versa, Svechin maintained a nuanced position quite similar to his views on 
attrition versus destruction. While he was generally inclined to see the defense 
as more powerful, this view was always dependent on particular technological, 
political, and material conditions. Though Svechin attributed to Clausewitz 
the view that defense was the strongest form of warfare, Svechin himself only 
endorsed that position in a highly qualified way. “We do not think,” he wrote, 
“that recognition of the defense as the strongest form of warfare is a mistake, 
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at least in the conditions of a Europe not caught in the midst of revolutionary 
upheaval.” Revolutionary warfare might change this equation, for “in the epoch 
of the French Revolution, its slogans made the offensive the strongest form of 
warfare,” but only until about 1805.54 Even if this statement about the offensive 
potential of revolutionary warfare does not reflect Svechin’s true views, but was 
instead dictated by his position in the service of an avowedly revolutionary Soviet 
Union, the fact remains that Svechin’s thought saw the balance between offense 
and defense shifting repeatedly over time. He saw no grounds for general laws of 
the superiority of one form over another.
A full appraisal of Svechin makes it clear that he saw offense and defense 
as intricately interconnected. In Svechin’s discussion of Clausewitz’s ideas, his 
nuanced views are clear. Both offensive and defensive actions are appropriate, with 
perhaps the most powerful form of military action being defense followed at the 
precisely correct moment by a counteroffensive. As Svechin phrased it,
Clausewitz saw defense as the strongest form of warfare, but 
conducted only for the achievement of negative goals, while offense 
is the weakest form but aims at positive goals. . . . A study of history 
obviously confirms the rationality of defensive action by the weaker 
side. . . . Strategically, defense permits the use of borders and the depth 
of the theater, which forces the attacker to waste strength occupying 
territory and expend time passing through it, while every bit of time 
won is a victory for the defense. The defender harvests what he did 
not sow, since the offense is often halted by faulty intelligence data, 
false rumors, and inertia. To the aid of the defender come second and 
third-line troops: landwehr and militia. With each step forward, the 
offensive weakens. Despite the simplicity and clarity of Clausewitz’s 
thought, the majority of writers before the World War worshipped 
the offensive at any cost, and the seizure of initiative. As a result, 
they concluded that Clausewitz was mistaken on this point.  We 
need to keep in mind that Clausewitz meant by defense not passive 
inactivity, but instead the endurance of the enemy’s first blow, which 
ought when possible to be followed by a strong riposte, an answering 
blow by the defense. . . . . The necessity which Clausewitz indicates, 
given sufficient strength, to set a positive goal clearly underlines the 
requirement to go over to the offensive as soon as previous defensive 
action creates on our side a predominance of force. A strong, sudden 
transition from defense to offense, a shining riposte—this is the 
highest achievement of the military art.55
Offensive and defensive operations each had their place, depending on 
circumstances and objective. Svechin described, for example, the eighteenth-
century military theorist Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd as regarding defense 
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as superior, but attributed these views to the particular circumstances of Lloyd’s 
era: small armies and stable frontiers.56 The ultimate question was political: “we 
differentiate between offensive and defensive operations depending on whether 
the strategy advances a positive or negative goal for the operation.” This decision 
in turn depends on circumstances: “The pursuit of negative aims, i.e. a struggle 
to preserve, requires generally speaking less outlay of strength and resources 
than the pursuit of positive aims, i.e. a struggle to seize, to move forward. . . . 
the weaker side, naturally, will turn to defense.”57 The choice of defense is not 
inherently superior, but instead as dependent on circumstances as the choice of 
attrition. “For defense to succeed,” Svechin writes, “we need to be able to lose 
territory, and we need to have time working in our favor.” While large states have 
more territory to lose, Svechin does not leap to the conclusion that states like 
Russia ought naturally to choose the strategic defense. It is necessary in addition 
to have “a decisive government and a strong internal position in order to have 
the possibility to weather the material losses connected with an enemy offensive 
and to force time to work in our favor . . . .”58 Svechin likewise sees the choice of 
positional as opposed to maneuver warfare as dictated by political aims and not 
the inherent superiority of one form of warfare to another. Positive aims produce 
mobile warfare; negative aims produce positional warfare. Coalition wars tend to 
positional warfare, as each party seeks to reduce its own expenditure of effort and 
freeload on its partners. Poor preparation for war produces positional warfare.59
Svechin and Brusilov
What has come before should demonstrate that Svechin was not the rigid 
adherent of attrition which he too often appears to be in Western literature. 
One might object, though, that Svechin’s general arguments for the usefulness of 
offensive campaigns, or tactics of destruction or annihilation, are pointless if in his 
own contemporary context, Russia in the early twentieth century, he saw attrition 
alone as a realistic option. Could it be, in other words, that his philosophical 
openness to other approaches is meaningless if in practical terms he saw Russia’s 
only options as defensive warfare based on attrition?
The problem with this approach is that Svechin publicly endorsed and 
advocated aggressive Russian tactics and risky offensives in the service of a 
campaign of annihilation. The circumstances involved the 1916 Brusilov offensive, 
an attack launched by the imperial Russian army’s South-Western Front under 
the command of General Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov against the Germans and 
Austro-Hungarians in present-day Ukraine. Brusilov’s innovative leadership and 
tactical innovations produced a stunning success, tsarist Russia’s greatest of the 
First World War. Brusilov’s offensive broke Austria-Hungary as an independent 
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force while netting hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian prisoners.60 
As the Soviet military drew on limited elements of tsarist Russia’s military 
experience for its own purposes (and indeed Brusilov continued to serve the Red 
Army after the revolution), the Brusilov offensive was the object of intensive 
study, including by Svechin himself. Svechin’s verdict on Brusilov, however, was 
not laudatory. While recognizing Brusilov’s achievement, Svechin criticized him 
for settling for tactical success and incremental gains, and failing to take advantage 
of an opportunity to shift from attrition to annihilation. In the circumstances of 
1916, with both France and Germany drained by the ongoing battle at Verdun 
and Austria-Hungary increasingly near collapse, the pursuit of annihilation as an 
operational goal might have created the possibility of a strategic victory. Svechin, 
the supposed partisan of attrition, criticized Brusilov, Russia’s greatest general of 
World War I, for his failure to abandon attrition for destruction.
The occasion for Svechin’s critique was a public meeting of Soviet Russia’s 
Military-Historical Commission to evaluate Brusilov’s campaign on 27 August 
1920, with the Russian Civil War still raging.61 Svechin opened the session by 
stressing the importance and historical significance of what Brusilov’s South-
Western Front had achieved. Within days of the offensive’s opening on 22 May/4 
June 1916, the South-Western Front’s four constituent armies (from north to 
south, the 8th, 11th, 7th, and 9th) had torn enormous holes in Austrian lines, 
inflicting massive casualties and putting the Austrian high command into a state 
of increasing panic. The northernmost 8th Army, under the command of the 
Cossack General Aleksei Maksimovich Kaledin, had achieved the greatest success, 
creating a 30-mile gap before the city of Lutsk, opening the path to the major 
transportation and communication centers of Kovel’ and L’viv (L’vov, Lemberg). 
Taking either would hinder Austrian withdrawal, and the Austrians lacked 
any reserves to plug the gap through which Russian divisions poured. Austrian 
resistance was collapsing, and the moment was ripe for the complete destruction 
of Austrian forces in Ukraine if only the opportunity could be seized.
But Brusilov made a fateful choice. On 25 May/7 June, as Kaledin’s 8th Army 
had carved out an enormous salient in Austrian lines, Brusilov was still urging 
Kaledin to “energetically pursue the enemy, not letting him rest. You need to strive to 
reach the line of the river Styr as quickly as possible. Have your heavy artillery follow, 
but do not wait for it to attack the retreating enemy, since what you receive as a gift 
today tomorrow you’ll have to fight for.”62 By the very next day, though, Brusilov 
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had come to a startling change of heart. While telling his armies that “the tactical 
successes achieved by the armies of our [South-Western] Front must be turned into 
a strategically complete operation,” he told Kaledin’s 8th Army, the one with the 
greatest potential for a strategically vital breakthrough, to “strengthen its positions 
on the Styr,” that is, where its center elements had achieved the greatest success. 
Instead of putting his emphasis on exploiting the breakthrough which already had 
been achieved, Brusilov instead directed the 8th to push ahead on its flanks, against 
unbroken Austrian forces. The advanced center was to halt; the lagging flanks to 
move ahead. Brusilov placed his heaviest reliance on a cavalry breakthrough (against 
dug-in infantry) by 8th Army’s IV Cavalry Corps on the right (northern) wing 
of 8th Army and the entire South-Western Front.63 Svechin saw this as a terrible 
mistake (though he mistook the date by a day):
The South-Western Front issued a directive for VIII Corps [leading 
the advance] to halt and the entire 8th Army to even up its lines. 
As part of this directive, the only unit receiving an active task 
was IV Cavalry Corps under the famed General Gillenschmidt, 
racer, sportsman . . . . Thus, at a time when on the front of the 
breakthrough our units moved freely and lacked only cavalry for a 
deep strike on the enemy rear, on the far right flank a cavalry mass 
carried out an unnecessary maneuver which produced no results.64
The consequences of this failure to exploit opportunity, Svechin held, were enor-
mous. 
The general situation on the South-Western Front had developed 
in such a way that the target was now the entire Austrian army, 
L’viv, supplies, the entire organization of the army. 25 May/7 June 
marked the critical moment of the war, at which, if we had enough 
spirit, we could have broken out of positional war and moved to 
a broad maneuver operation. However, we did not have enough 
spirit and instead of taking a leap forward we began to worry about 
consolidating what the front had already captured. . . . Instead of 
having laggards catch up with our shining units, we had our units 
level themselves at mediocrity . . . 65
Brusilov’s forces resumed their offensive over the following days, but a vital 
opportunity had been lost. The Austrians and their German allies won time with 
Brusilov’s interrupted offensive to scrape together reserves to contain Brusilov’s 
breakthrough and restore equilibrium.
In fact, Svechin was harder on Brusilov than the documentary record can 
justify. Kaledin, Brusilov’s subordinate, was certainly not a dynamic commander. 
The Russian high command also bears some responsibility. While Svechin thought 
that Stavka had tried on 27 May/9 June to convince Brusilov to resume his 
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offensive, in fact the high command’s actual orders to Brusilov on that day endorse 
Brusilov’s plan for 8th Army to expend its strength on ultimately futile efforts 
by IV Cavalry Corps to push forward on 8th Army’s right (northern) flank.66 
Nonetheless, Brusilov did not dispute Svechin’s basic point that an enormous 
opportunity to turn tactical and operational success into a truly strategic victory 
had been squandered by failing to exploit 8th Army’s breakthrough. Brusilov’s 
forces had attacked dug-in Austrian troops directly rather than bypassing and 
isolating remaining Austrian centers of resistance. Brusilov, who was present at 
the discussion and responded to Svechin, could only blame Kaledin, his superiors 
at Stavka, and Russia’s other Front commanders for his failure.67
The point here is not the justice of Svechin’s criticism of Brusilov, but its 
nature. Brusilov had managed precisely the sort of attritional success typically 
and incorrectly regarded as what Svechin aimed for—limited and local victories 
which would, with time and effort, wear down and defeat an enemy. What Svechin 
in fact saw in 1916 was the fateful failure to seize an opportunity for strategic 
success by a bold stroke aimed at operational or even strategic annihilation: bold 
exploitation of the breakthrough at Lutsk to push further, to Kovel or L’viv, cutting 
off retreating Austrian forces and perhaps driving Austria from the war altogether. 
Svechin said “the offensive was stopped not by the enemy, but . . . by the orders of 
the Commander of the South-Western Front.” This was going too far, since there 
was blame to be shared by Stavka and by Kaledin, not just Brusilov. But Svechin’s 
assessment of what had been lost still stands, and it was precisely the chance for 
annihilation of the enemy: “Before us we had space to maneuver, and instead we 
looked for defense and sought a quick return to positional warfare.”68 Svechin’s 
insistence on the power of circumstance—that no approach to warfare could be 
endorsed without clear understanding of the particular time and place that made it 
appropriate, was eminently clear in 1920. Brusilov’s failure, in Svechin’s mind, was 
exactly what Svechin has too often been dismissed as doing: settling for attrition 
and rejecting destruction.
66. Compare Cherkasov, 13, with Alekseev to Brusilov, 27 May/9 June 1916, in Nastuplenie, 
doc. 188, 252.
67. Brusilov in Cherkasov, Lutskii proryv, 20-25.
68. Ibid., 17-18.
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